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31 July 1963

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CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE

BULLETIN



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DAILY BRIEF

*North Korea - US: More armed clashes are possible following the 29 and 30 July incidents in which three US soldiers were killed by North Koreans.

US and possibly North Korean military forces along the demilitarized zone have been placed on an alert status.

The incidents do not appear to have been a deliberate effort to increase tension along the demilitarized zone. North Korean reconnaissance and infiltration groups have frequently been active in the past across the demilitarized zone in this general area. On 29 July. US troops were ambushed, most likely by such an armed North Korean group after it had apparently been detected by US forces. The attackers may have continued into South Korea. Two groups of North Koreans were engaged by US and South Korean forces some 6 miles south of the demilitarized zone on 30 July. Four of the North Koreans were killed.

Pyongyang propaganda has not yet mentioned the incidents. The only previous North Korean attack on US forces since the 1953 armistice occurred on 20 November 1962. The North Koreans made no attempt to exploit this incident for propaganda purposes.

*British Guiana: (The Jagan government continues to drift toward closer ties with Cuba and the Soviet bloc.

Georgetown recently proposed to set up a government corporation to take over British Guiana Airways. There is ample indication that one motive behind this proposal is a desire to open regular air service with Cuba. Jagan intimated as much at the West Indies "summit" last week where he insisted that Cuba be brought into any regional sea or air service that may be established.

Havana radio is already claiming that British Guiana has granted Cuba reciprocal landing rights. It also asserts that Georgetown is not only agreeable to facilitating Cuban air access to British Guiana but also throughout the Caribbean area as well.)

London is considering a procedure to impede the movement via British territories of subversives by requiring all travelers to and from Cuba to possess transit visas. This procedure, however, would leave a considerable loophole as the UK would issue such visas to "legitimate" travelers.

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DAILY BRIEF

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Venezuela: The Communists have resumed guerrilla activity in western Venezuela.

In the past several days, guerrilla groups temporarily held three small towns in Falcon State. The Venezuelan Government has been conducting extensive counterguerrilla operations there since early this year. These raids resulted in several government casualties and the loss of arms and ammunition.

The guerrilla forces are almost certainly involved with the Communist-led Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN).

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Burma: Secret discussions are under way between the Ne Win regime and Burmese underground Communist leaders who recently returned from Peiping.

Eighteen of the Burmese Communist leaders who fled to China in the early 1950s have arrived without publicity in Rangoon since mid-July, according to local observers. The Communists were flown in on Chinese Communist aircraft and were met by Burmese military representatives.)

The talks are a part of Ne Win's over-all effort to bring together Burma's various dissident political and ethnic groups. However, the Burmese Communist movement's total membership is estimated at only 1,200 and it is so faction-ridden that any agreement the returned exiles might make would be of little use in developing support for the regime.

Ne Win's civilian critics are likely to be moved to cooperate more closely against him once his talks with the Communists become known. The implication that the returned exiles are under Chinese tutelage may also weaken Ne Win's standing with certain elements of the army which have become increasingly apprehensive of his leftist tendencies, and are fearful of Chinese influence.

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*Communist China--Test-Ban Treaty: Communist China's first formal reaction to the test-ban treaty appears designed primarily to gain Peiping advantage in the Sino-Soviet struggle by blackening Moscow before the world Communist movement as a willing accomplice of "imperialism."

Peiping's statement of 31 July charges that the Soviet government now pursues a policy of allying itself with the US against China and against peace and socialism—an about—face summed up as "capitulation to US imperialism." Peiping has, until now, been content to make this charge by implication.

The statement repeats previous Chinese attacks on the test ban as a "dirty fraud" designed to prevent nonnuclear powers from obtaining modern weapons. The Chinese declare it "unthinkable" for Peiping to be a party to the agreement, under which they say the US has everything to gain and nothing to lose.

Depicting themselves as champions of peace—which they claim is threatened by the treaty—the Chinese cynically offer alternate nuclear disarmament proposals which Peiping probably hopes will obstruct widespread adherence to the Moscow agreement. These proposals include a call for a meeting of all world government leaders to discuss the total prohibition of nuclear weapons.

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NOTES

Finland - West Germany: The Finnish Government has agreed to permit the West German commercial mission in Helsinki to open two branch offices. The Finns anticipate an East German request for similar privileges, but intend to reject it on grounds that no basis for reciprocity exists since Finland does not maintain branch offices in East Germany as it does in West Germany. The US Embassy notes that the Soviet Union has not yet reacted and thus the question of what Finland might have to do by way of a "balancing gesture" remains unanswered.

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DAILY BRIEF

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Executive Offices of the White House

Special Counsel to the President

The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Under Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Assistant Secretary of Defense

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

Commander in Chief, Atlantic

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The Director, The Joint Staff

The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

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
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